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Abstract
In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal
matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012
period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones,
by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by
combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the
three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job
title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent
counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid
job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers
among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into
firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control
for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an
overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.
1 Introduction
The high unemployment rates in continental Europe during the 1970s diffused the opinion among policy-makers
that labor markets were excessively rigid. However, rather than reducing the employment protection legislation for
permanent contracts, most European countries introduced fixed-term contracts (FTC). Portugal was not an exception,
allowing firms to establish fixed-term contracts since 1976. Basically, these are contracts with an agreed duration for
which, upon expiration, the termination can occur done at a small or even no cost. However, if the employer decides
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to keep the worker, the contract must be converted into a permanent one, facing up to the regular firing costs.1
Not surprisingly, it is well documented that fixed-term contracts can reduce some of those labor market rigidities
(e.g. Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). However, since the 1980s, some economists have been expressing concerns about
the perverse effects of those “two-tier labor markets”, with a mix of theoretical and empirical analysis. Most academic
researchers have been dedicating their attention to the employment effects of fixed-term contracts (e.g. Blanchard and
Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cahuc et al., 2012; Boeri, 2011), finding that they can lead to higher job
turnover, lower productivity and lower workers welfare, while the impact on employment seems unclear. Additionally,
some researches have also been motivated to study the effects of using fixed-term contracts on other dimensions such
as its impact on wages, job satisfaction, training and even workers career prospects (e.g. Booth et al, 2002).
Prior evidence suggests that permanent workers tend to be favored in all of those dimensions when compared to
fixed-term workers. In particular, there are several studies analyzing the wage gap between permanent and fixed-term
workers. Regarding the theoretical discussion, there is no consensus about the wage effects of using fixed-term
contracts and the topic has given rise to a number of competing arguments. For instance, while the theory of equalizing
differences predicts higher wages for fixed-term workers, the dual labor market theory supports that fixed-term contracts
result in lower wages than permanent contracts.2 As for empirical evidence, the existing literature suggests that
fixed-term workers receive lower wages than observationally equivalent permanent workers. Nevertheless, observed
measures of workers’ skills and firms’ characteristics are far from perfect, in that they leave plenty of room for
unobserved heterogeneity at the worker but also at the firm level. Additionally, some authors have also considered
job-title and worker-firm match characteristics as important determinants of wages, in which case the aforementioned
estimated wage gaps may capture differences in returns due to differences in any of these dimensions (Abowd et al.,
1999; Woodcock, 2008; Torres et. al, 2013). To control for those unobservables, some authors employed fixed-effects
models to account for either time-invariant characteristics of workers or firms (e.g. Booth et al., 2002). Unfortunately,
the lack of large and rich databases containing worker-firm matched information on wages and their determinants has
made a more detailed analysis impossible (e.g. De la Rica, 2004).
The reason of concern with these perverse effects is greater, the larger the gap between employment protection
legislation for permanent and fixed-term workers. Particularly, Portugal is considered as a country with one of the
largest employment protection gaps amongst OECD countries due to a mix of strict rules protecting permanent workers
with only a mild regulation governing fixed-term contracts . Consequently, the use of fixed-term contracts is at the
heart of political and economical debate. In fact, the numbers are worrisome. Since the mid-1990s, the majority of
unemployed workers was hired with a fixed-term contract. Centeno and Novo (2012) gives evidence that, in 2010, the
1Under some circumstances, the employer can also offer a new fixed-term contract to the worker. The restrictions associated with the use of FTC
(in terms of renewables and maximum duration) are imposed to circumvent abuses; however, they may result in lower levels of job security. (OECD,
2014)
2A more detailed review of those theoretical views is presented at Section 3 of the current Thesis.
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percentage of unemployed individuals hired with a FTC reached the maximum of about 90%. Moreover, around two
thirds of workers who became unemployed had a fixed-term contract. Figure 1 shows the percentage of workers under
a fixed-term contract which ranged from 18,8% (2010) to 26,3% (2008).3
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The purpose of this study is to extend the empirical analysis of the wage gap between workers under permanent and
fixed-term contracts in Portugal, for which there are no similar studies. Using an employer-employee linked dataset,
Quadros de Pessoal, covering the 2002-2012 period, we are able to estimate an extended version of the standard
Mincerian wage equation that includes controls for worker, firm and job-title fixed effects. The estimation of a model
with three high-dimensional effects allows us to refine the previously employed methods since we are able to filter the
estimated FTC wage gap simultaneously from three different dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity.
Another contribution of our work to the existing literature on FTC wage gap is an unprecedented and detailed study
of its sources. By using the methodology proposed by Gelbach’s (2014), we are able to disentangle the independent
contribution of workers average productivity, the firm remuneration policy and the job-title policies to the creation of
that wage gap.
Finally, in order to also account for worker-firm match quality, we extend our previous three fixed effects model
also for the permanent characteristics of a worker-firm match going past identification issues with the estimation of the
four effects.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. A brief context of the Portuguese employment protection
legislation is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents a discussion of the expected wage effects based on several
competing theories, alongside a review the empirical literature on this topic, presenting some results that support those
theoretical considerations. Additionally, the dataset is described in Section 4. The discussion of the empirical strategy
and its results are the core of section 4; in this section, we estimate a FTC wage gap filtered from worker, firm and
job-title permanent heterogeneity and then we study the sources of the FTC wage gap, by considering the independent
3The proportion of FTC was computed based on Quadros de Pessoal 2002-2012, with the restrictions which are described in Section 3.
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contribution of the worker’s average productivity, the compensation policy and the job-title policy to that wage gap.
We also extend this exercise to another similar model, extended by an iteration term, in order to take into consideration
the worker-firm match quality. Finally, in Section 5, we draw some concluding remarks.
2 The Portuguese Employment Protection Legislation
A well-known feature of the Portuguese labor market is its stringent overall employment protection legislation which
is particularly due to the strict rules that protect permanent workers against individual dismissal. However, when
compared to other European countries with a tight legislation on permanent contracts, Portugal has a peculiar characteristic
that cannot be ignored: while the other European strict-EPL countries, such as Spain, usually have stringent rules for
the use of temporary forms of employment, Portugal has only a mild regulation.4 As a consequence, Portugal is
characterized by one of the largest employment protection legislation gaps between temporary and regular contracts
(OECD, 2014).
After the Carnation Revolution in 1974, which overthrew a 48-year-old dictatorship, the Portuguese politicians
imposed very restrictive rules on the dismissals of permanent workers. In 1976, a new government decided to introduce
for the first time the possibility of using fixed-term contracts, establishing their maximum legal duration as three
years. In 1986, following the accesion to the European Economic Community and after a period of relative economic
stagnation, a labor market reform was undertaken which softened the conditions regulating the dismissal of permanent
workers and clearly defined fixed-term contracts to be used only in specific situations, setting their maximum legal
duration with two renewals. Another interesting innovation introduced by this reform was the fact that a worker
started having the right to a severance payment when the fixed-term contract terminates without the conversion into a
permanent one. 5
During the last decade, subsequent governments adopted several reforms aimed at promoting a more flexible labor
market. The first of those was undertaken in 2004, whose main characteristic was an attempt to ease EPL by reducing
the constraints governing the use of temporary contracts, while the legislation on regular contracts remained practically
unchanged. More specifically, it widened the range of circumstances in which a firm could hire under fixed-term
contracts and extended the maximum legal duration. There were three main changes which should be underlined.
First, it introduced the possibility to hire a worker under a fixed-term contract just to meet temporary needs of the firms,
extending the number of valid situations for the use of fixed-term contracts. Secondly, the maximum legal duration of a
4For example, according to 2013 OECD indicators, Portugal was the 15th country with a more restrictive regulation on temporary forms of
employment, among the total of 34 OECD countries. However, Portugal was the OECD country with a more stringent policy related with the
protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal.
5In 1989, the severance payment was initially settled to two days for each month of work. However, in 2001, it was extended to three days
for each month of work. In reality, this is similar to the severance payment associated with regular contracts (30 days for each year of Seniority).
However, the dismissal costs not only include severance payments but also administrative costs. Centeno and Novo (2013) discuss that administrative
costs related with dismissals of permanent contracts are much higher than those for fixed-term contracts.
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fixed-term contract was extended from 3 years to 6 years. Finally, the number of possible renewables until reaching its
maximum legal duration was also extended from two to three times. This reform increased the legislation gap between
fixed-term and regular contracts.
Later, in 2009, the labor code was once again revised with the adoption of measures to reduce substantially the
EPL on regular contracts. In brief, the main changes were related with the reduction of the procedural processes for
individual dismissals on permanent contracts, the extension in the trial period for all workers and the reduction of notice
and severance payment due to no-fault dismissals. In addition, the maximum legal duration of fixed-term contracts was
re-established to three years. Consequently, between 2003 and 2009, Portugal was the OECD country that most eased
its EPL (Venn, 2009). More recently, in 2012, a broad reform was introduced to continue the path towards a more
flexible labor market. Within the large set of changes, the new law allowed the fixed-term contracts to be renewed two
additional times, up to the maximum of four and a half years. Unfortunately, as mentioned below, we are only able to
study the 2002-2012 period due to the scope of our data set.
In the Portuguese labor market, and broadly in the other two tiers systems (such as the Spanish one), the main
difference between permanent and fixed-term contracts are the procedural costs and the uncertainty related with
dismissals, rather than severance payments. After the expiration of a fixed-term contract, these costs are significant
for permanent workers, but nonexistent for fixed-term contracts. The dismissal of a permanent worker involves several
legally established stages, depending on the type of dismissal. For example, when a firm wants to fire a worker due
to reasons attributable to the worker, the firm must justify its decision; then, there is a stage for the defense and the
instruction; finally, after an appreciation, a decision is taken (Martins, 2012). As all processes, the decision can also
be contested in courts. These trial battles generally involve several individuals or entities, such as witnesses or even
unions. Therefore, the costs of firing a worker are the procedural costs and the uncertainty about the duration of that
process. In order to avoid this, firms and workers generally agree on higher severance payments than those stipulated by
law. To sum up, it is not surprising that the dismissal of permanent workers is a lengthy and costly process, constituting
a rigidity in the Portuguese labor market (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).
3 Theoretical Considerations and Previous Empirical Evidence
3.1 Fixed-term Contracts and Wages
The wage effects of using fixed-term contacts have driven several theoretical considerations, which are briefly presented
in this section. At the same time, we also review empirical studies that found evidence in favor of each of those - in
some cases conflicting - theoretical views.
According to the theory of equalizing differences, compensating wage differentials are required to equalize disadvantages
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among work activities (Rosen, 1986). Basically, the neoclassical labor market theory states that, other things being
equal, in a competitive labor market, a worker on fixed-term contract should receive a higher wage than a worker on a
permanent contract in order to compensate for the higher risk of unemployment or even for the uncertainty about the
future working life (Booth et al., 2002).
However, even though estimates may significantly vary from one study to another, empirical research finds a wage
penalty against fixed-term workers (such as Booth et al. (2002) for Britain; Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France;
Hagen (2002), Pteifer (2012) for Germany; Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and De la Rica (2004) for Spain; Mertens et al.
(2007) for Spain and Germany).
This empirical evidence may be supported by another strand of the literature. Doeringer and Piore (1971) originally
developed the dual labor market theory, which states that the labor market is composed by a primary and a secondary
segment. On the one hand, the primary segment is characterized by secure, skilled and stable jobs with good working
conditions and opportunities for career progress. On the other hand, the secondary market is characterized by low-skilled,
low-paid and unstable jobs with lower training opportunities and promotion prospects. In this model, as there is little
mobility between segments, fixed-term employees fall in a cycle of fixed-term contracts and unemployment with low
wages and wage growth over time. In fact, De la Rica (2004) suggests that workers on fixed-term contracts are
segregated into low-paying firms and low-paying occupations within firms. Mertens et al. (2007) also conclude that in
Spain fixed-term workers are concentrated in the secondary segment.
Additionally, firms may also use fixed-term contracts as a flexible buffer to face short-term demand shocks by
adjusting the level of employment at a lower cost, leading to job positions with worse working conditions and more
subject to unemployment (e.g. Varejão and Portugal, 2009). Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) construct a theoretical
model that suggests that fixed-term contracts increase responsiveness to aggregate shocks, reducing their persistence.
Consistently, Bockmann and Hagen (2001) find that positive changes in predicted or actual sales are positively related
with the probability of employing temporary workers, suggesting that fixed-term contracts are used to increase flexibility.
Another relevant argument claims that in the presence of asymmetric information between workers and employers,
a job is an “experience good”: the quality of a worker-firm match can only be determined after the creation and
“experimentation” over time of that match (Jovanovich, 1979). According to the screening hypothesis, firms can use
fixed-term contracts to extend the legally limited probation period, during which the employer screens workers with
uncertain skills and abilities at a smaller cost (e.g., Booth et al., 2002; Portugal and Varejão, 2010). Therefore, if the
fixed-term worker satisfies the hiring standards of the firm, his contract is converted into a permanent one. Fixed-term
workers generally receive lower initial wages but they are compensated by higher future wages as they are converted
into permanent contracts meaning, for starters on fixed-term contracts, wages should converge to the permanent level.
The use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device is also highly supported empirically (e.g., McGinnity and Mertens,
2002, for West Germany; Boockmann and Hagen, 2001, for Germany; Both et al., 2002, for Britain; Pavlopoulos, 2013,
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for UK and Germany).
There are also other determinants that can influence the wage gap. As workers on fixed-term contracts face a higher
risk of unemployment and lower career prospects within the firm, they have lower incentives to invest in firm-specific
capital, leading to negative and persistent wage gaps since a fixed-term contract signals lower productivity (Hagen,
2002; Pavlopoulos, 2013).
Moreover, according to the insider-outsider theory, workers on permanent contracts can influence working conditions
in their favor (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). In fact, a worker on a permanent contract has more bargaining power than
a worker on fixed-term contract, ceteris paribus, since the higher firing costs for permanent contracts raise the value of
continuing the employment relationship (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). Consequently, workers on permanent contracts
are predicted to earn higher wages due to the higher bargaining power. Additionally, one cannot forget the role of unions
in the wage-setting process. Theoretically, if fixed-term workers are concentrated in low unionized sectors, one should
expect lower wages for the workers with fixed term contracts (Boockmann and Hagen, 2001).
In addition to these theoretical views, some countries (such as Portugal) have a clear legislation requiring equal
treatment for permanent and temporary workers and forbidding wage discrimination according to the type of contract.
Also, the European Commission has directives aimed at ensuring equal basic working conditions for temporary workers
(including equal treatment in terms of payment).6
Regarding the Portuguese labor market, Varejão and Portugal (2010) find evidence that fixed-term contracts are
used as screening devices. Additionally, using a Difference-in-Differences approach to the 2004 labor market reform,
in which the employment protection of open-ended contracts was extended only to firms with 11-20 workers, Centeno
and Novo (2012) conclude that fixed-term contracts are used as a source of flexibility, both in terms of wages and
employment levels.
3.2 Why Do Fixed-term Workers Accept Fixed-term Contracts?
The compensating wage differential approach provides by itself one reason for workers accepting fixed-term contracts.
However, if there are no wage differentials compensating for the worst working conditions, one may question fixed-term
workers’ rationality.
First of all, some jobs are only available with fixed-term contracts such as those with flexible schedules that allow
to meet non-work duties or personal preferences (Hagen, 2002). Additionally, the compensating wage differential
approach assumes implicitly that the worker’s choice is between fixed-term and permanent contracts, not between a
fixed-term contract and unemployment (Mertens et al., 2007). However, firms may only be available to offer permanent
contracts to workers of high perceived ability (Booth et al., 2002). Subsequently, some individuals may accept a FTC
6For example, the Council Directive 99/70/EC of 28 June 1999 establishes minimum requirements governing the fixed-term contracts in order to
ensure an equal treatment of those workers when compared to regular workers.
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because otherwise they would be unemployed, especially in economic downturns (Silva, 2014).
Second, as mentioned above, a fixed-term contract can serve as a sorting device when there is asymmetric information
between worker and employer. Therefore, the worker may use it to signal his ability and competencies. Consistently,
Loh (1994) developed a model in which workers with high ability select themselves into jobs initially on FTC while
low ability workers prefer jobs with no probation period. This result is quite obvious since high ability workers face
a low probability of being dismissed once their ability has been revealed. In this model, the sorting mechanism is
important: again, it is assumed that jobs on fixed-term contracts have lower wages, which are compensated by a future
high wage increase (when they are converted into permanent contract).
4 The Dataset Quadros de Pessoal (2002-2012)
The database employed in this study is Quadros de Pessoal which is a “longitudinal matched employer-employee-job
title dataset” (Cardoso et al., 2013). The data are collected in October of every year by the Portuguese Minister
of Employment through a mandatory inquiry that covers every establishment operating in Portugal with at least one
wage-earner.
Given the enforceability by law of this survey, some of problems usually associated with panel data sets (such as
panel attrition or measurement error phenomena) are mitigated. Also, the fact that this information is of public use
reinforces our trust in the quality of the information (Vilares, 2013).
This survey contains detailed information on worker’s characteristics (such as gender, age, education, earnings,
occupation, tenure, work schedule and type of contract), firm’s characteristics (such as location, economic activity,
number of workers, number of temporary and permanent workers, sales and legal status) and each of its affiliated
establishments (such as location, economic activity and employment).
An important feature of Quadros de Pessoal is that the information regarding labor earnings is very exhaustive. It
includes base wages (gross pay for standard working hours), overtime payments, regular benefits (such as seniority)
and non-regular benefits (premiums). It also contains information on normal and overtime hours of work. As the
information on labor earnings is reported by the employer, it is more likely to be truthful than worked-provided data
(Cardoso et al., 2013).
As mentioned above, Quadros de Pessoal is, by construction, a longitudinal dataset. Each worker is assigned
a unique identification code that is based on their social security number. Similarly, each firm/establishment has a
unique identification number. It is also worth noting that Quadros de Pessoal gathers information on collective wage
agreements. Basically, each worker is assigned annually to a specific professional category and the corresponding
collective agreement. The identification of different occupational categories within each agreement allows us to identify
the job-title that each worker holds in a given year. This method enables to track them over the years and to match, in
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each year, individuals with their firms, the associated collective agreement and the corresponding job-title.
In the estimation of the fixed-term contract wage gap we impose a set of restraints on the raw database. First,
because the information on the type of contract is only available since 2002, we had to restrict our analysis to full-time
workers between 2002 and 2012. Additionally, we excluded individuals working in all other forms of employment
apart from fixed-term or permanent contracts. Second, we focused on individuals of the age group between 16 and 65
years old. Third, workers from the Agriculture, Fishery and Mining sectors are also excluded. Fourth, in addition, we
dropped from our study workers whose reported monthly wages were below 80 percent of the mandatory minimum
wage as well as those whose tenure was above 50 years. Fifth, individuals who were reported as workers in more
than one firm in a given year are also excised. Finally, we limited our dataset to the observations that belong to the
largest connected group, dropping around 0,6% of the total number of observations. This is the only way to ensure the
comparability between the estimates of fixed effects.7
Our final sample comprises 20,634,484 observations (from which about 22% represent individuals working under
a fixed-term contract), consisting of 4,364,076 independent workers and 502,135 firms tracked over the 2002-2012
period. It is also possible to identify a total of 91,205 different job titles. Table 3 in Appendix A reports summary
statistics for both permanent and fixed-term workers. Permanent workers are significantly older than fixed-term
workers. Additionally, the proportion of females is slightly higher in the group of fixed-term workers. As expected,
individuals working under a permanent contract have higher tenures than their fixed-term counterparts. Regarding
education, it seems that permanent workers have fewer years of education when compared to fixed-term counterparts.
Moreover, the type of contract used vary according to the sector. Not surprisingly, the manufacturing sector represents
the large share of the total permanent contracts, while the use of fixed-term contracts is more relevant in sectors such
as construction and hotels and restaurants. Finally, fixed-term workers earn considerably lower hourly wages than
those under permanent ones. The raw wage gap is 0.55 euros per hour (which represents about 26% of the average
permanent hourly wage).
5 Model to Estimate Fixed-term Workers Wage Gap
5.1 A Brief Review on the Empirical Procedures to Estimate the FTC wage gap
There is a variety of empirical studies with the purpose of estimating the wage gap between fixed-term and permanent
contracts. As mentioned above, all those research works find a wage penalty for fixed-term workers, regardless of the
country under analysis or the employed method; however, two caveats must be mentioned. Firstly, there has been no
consensus on the most appropriate empirical strategy to estimate the fixed-term contracts wage gap. Secondly, as in
7For a detailed explanation of the concept of “connected group”, please see Torres et. al (2013)
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any empirical study, researchers are restricted by the information available in their dataset. Nevertheless, it is possible
to identify two major types of procedures.
On the one hand, there are non selection models which rely on a standard Mincerian equation with a control for the
type of contract which can be estimated using either cross-sectional or panel data. In reality, even in studies with other
preferred specifications, it is considered as a useful parsimonious benchmark model. Naturally, the estimates of the
wage differential between fixed-term and regular contracts are quite sensitive to the set of observable controls included
in the regression (e.g. Pteifer, 2012) which may reflect the presence of omitted variable bias in some specifications.
However, the main drawback of the above model is that it may also produce biased estimates, if unobserved
characteristics of workers and firms are correlated with the included regressors. In this sense, some researchers find
the introduction of fixed effects to be an appealing procedure to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics.
Therefore, when longitudinal dataset is available, they tend to resort to another type of models: fixed-effect (FE)
estimators (e.g. Mertens et al. al, 2007). To the best of our knowledge, in the existing literature, FE models only
control for one fixed-effect: either the firm or the individual fixed-effect.
On the other hand, another relevant bulk of studies try to overcome the selection problem. If fixed-term contracts
are a choice variable, its decision may be correlated with the unobservables that influence wages. Then, not controlling
for this selection problem might result in biased estimates. Therefore, some researchers include the usual Heckman
correction term in the standard OLS wage regression (e.g. Hagen, 2002). Selection models have been criticized for
some of their assumptions that are crucial for the identification: at least one regressor has to be assumed to directly
influence the fixed-term contract decision, but not the wages and the consistency of this type of model is based on the
joint normal distribution of the error terms, which is an arbitrary and maybe too strong assumption.
In addition, there are also other methods which are less common. Some researchers estimate separately wage
equations for workers under fixed-term and permanent contracts (e.g. De la Rica, 2004). Mertens et al. (2007)
estimates a quantile regression to see if the wage gap varies across the conditional wage distribution. Its main drawback
is that it does not allow the inclusion of fixed-effects. Alternatively, Hagen (2002) uses a matching method which main
advantage is not assuming functional forms. However, it only allows to control for observable characteristics.
In a nutshell, the empirical procedure to estimate the wage gap between fixed-term and permanent contracts must
be carefully chosen since all methods have advantages and drawbacks. Considering only observable characteristics
of firms and workers has also been though-out as a source of concern due to the omitted variable bias problem.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, a wage penalty for individuals working under fixed-term contracts is always found.
However, a proper study of the sources of the FTC wage gap is absent from the literature.
10
5.2 The Proposed Method to Estimate the FTC Wage Gap and to Find its Sources
5.2.1 Statistical Framework: the Role of Worker, Firm and Job-title Fixed-Effects
In this sub-section, we describe the adopted empirical strategy to estimate the wage gap between fixed-term and
permanent contracts and the methodology developed by Gelbach (2014) to compute a detailed decomposition of that
wage gap. We use the statistical framework of Cardoso et al. (2013) which allows worker, firm and job-title fixed
effects to be estimated simultaneously in wage regressions. Thus, the full model constitutes an extended version of the
traditional Mincerian wage equation:
wi f jt = αi +θ f +λ j + γ
f ull
t +ξ
f ullFTCit +β f ullXit + ε
f ull
i f jt (1)
where wi f jt represents the natural logarithm of labor real hourly earnings of individual workeri (i=1,. . . ,N) working
at firm f ( f =1,. . . , F) and holding the job-tittle j ( j=1, . . . , J) at year t (t=1, ., Ti).8 Note that there are a total
of Ti observations for each individual i and therefore the total number of observations is T ∗ (Ti ∗N). Our variable
of interest is FTCit , a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed under a fixed-term
contract and 0 otherwise. The Xit is a set of standard individual controls including age, age square, tenure, tenure
square and education dummies9. The observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics are captured through the
inclusion of worker fixed effect (αi). By the same reasoning, θ f is the firm fixed effect which controls for observed
and unobserved firm time-invariant characteristics while λ j is the job-title fixed effect which captures observed and
unobserved job-title time-invariant characteristics. Additionally, γt represents a set of annual dummies that allows
to control for time-specific trends, capturing macroeconomic effects. Finally, it includes an unexplained error term
(εi f jt ) which is assumed to follow the conventional assumptions. In the present estimation, we resort to a procedure
developed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) to compute the exact OLS solution for the linear regression with three
high-dimensional fixed effects.
Two main advantages can be pointed out of this specification relatively to the standard Mincerian equation. First
of all, by including the three fixed effects, we are controlling for time-invariant characteristics of individuals, firms
and job-titles, including unobservables. If these unobserved specificities are correlated with the set of controls, the
non-inclusion of the three fixed-effects in the regression would result in biased estimates. As stated above, the FE
models used in the existing literature of FTC wage gap only control for one fixed-effect: either the firm or the individual
8Because the information on earnings is very complete, we are to construct a measure of labor hourly earnings to be used as dependent variable
in our estimation equations. Hourly earnings are simply obtained from the ratio of total payroll (the sum of base wages, overtime payments, regular
and non-regular payments) over total hours of work (standard plus overtime hours). All compensation variables are deflated using the Consumer
Price Index (with base-year 1986).
9 Information on age is available in years whereas tenure is measured in months.
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fixed-effect. Therefore, we are improving those models, by simultaneously taking into account both workers and
firms fixed effects and introducing the job-title fixed effect. Secondly, by controlling for the permanent unobservable
heterogeneity of firms and individuals, we are attenuating the problem of the selection bias.10
However, it also has some handicaps which are in line with the existing literature. First, the model assumes a
linear relationship between wages and its set of explanatory variables. Since it is a parametric approach, we are
losing some flexibility. Secondly, as it is based on the estimation of fixed-effects, the model requires a detailed
microeconomics dataset. In addition, panel datas are also usually associated with problems of measurement which
may lead to measurement bias. Therefore, we need a detailed and reliable longitudinal data set which is not commonly
available for researchers. Fortunately, in the present treatment, this is not a matter of concern due to the unusual
richness of our database.
The estimation of equation (1) can be interpreted as the conditional expectation of hourly labor earnings given
the observable characteristics of firms and workers, the year of observation and the identity of individuals, firms and
corresponding job titles. In particular, we are able to identify the FTC wage gap that is not explained by observed and
time-invariant unobserved characteristics of firms, workers and job-title. However, we can get a better understanding of
the FTC wage gap by computing the independent contribution of each fixed effect to the wage gap between fixed-term
and permanent contracts. For this purpose, we rely on the decomposition proposed by Gelbach (2014).
The first step of the Gelbach’s decomposition requires the estimation of the full model which is represented by
equation (1).11 Afterwards, a base model with no fixed effects needs to be estimated:
wi f jt = γbaset +ξ
baseFTCit +β baseXit + εbasei f jt (2)
Note that this specification corresponds to the standard Mincerian equation. From now on, we will refer to the
estimated FTC wage gap in this equation as the conditional wage gap, since we are only controlling for observable
characteristics of individuals.12 It is worth nothing that, by excluding the worker, firm and job-title fixed effects,
this specification suffers from omitted variable bias. In reality, the difference between the coefficients of the base
specification and the full specification can be represented by the sample version of the omitted variable bias formula.
Centering our interest on the coefficient for fixed-term contracts variable, the simple procedure proposed by Gelbach
(2014) allows us to compute an unambiguous quantification of the contribution of each fixed-effect to the change in
the estimated coefficient for the FTC variable, that is, to the difference ξ base−ξ f ull .
Then, the decomposition proceeds with the estimation of the regressions of the estimates of the fixed effects
10If the fixed-term contract decision is correlated with unobservable time-varying characteristics, the problem of selection bias will persist.
However, when compared to the Heckman correction, this methodology has the advantage of not assuming an ad-hoc excluded restriction and the
joint normal distribution of both error terms. We also tried to construct possible instruments - some of them are proposed in the existing literature
(such as the lag rate of fixed-term contracts by economic sector) - but we were not successful due to the weakness of those instruments.
11See the Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the Gelbach’s decomposition.
12In addition to the set of controls used in equation (1), the matrix Xit also includes gender.
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(α̂i,θ̂i,λ̂i) on the explanatory variables included in the base model:
α̂i = η
α FTCit +β α Xi f t + εαi f jt (3a)
θ̂i = η
θ FTCit +β θ Xi f t +νθi f jt (3b)
λ̂i = η
λ FTCit +β λ Xi f t +νλi f jt (3c)
Finally, the methodology leads to the following identity:
ξ
base−ξ f ull = η̂α + η̂θ + η̂λ (4)
With the above result, we are able to disentangle the contribution of each excluded variable (each fixed effect) to
the wage gap between fixed-term and permanent contracts. For example, if the coefficient η̂θ is negative, it can be
interpreted as the log point reduction in the wage gap between fixed-term and permanent contracts that would occur if
workers under fixed-term and permanent contracts were equally distributed across firms, conditional on gender, wage,
tenure and education (Cardoso et al., 2013). This result would suggest that workers under fixed-term contracts tend to
work for firms that pay, on average, lower wages. A similar interpretation can be given to the other two fixed-effects.
Therefore, as stated by Raposo et al. (2014), “the decomposition proposed by Gelbach is a computationally simple and
econometrically meaningful procedure”.
5.2.2 Empirical Results Based on the Three High Dimensional Fixed-effects Model
In Portugal, during the 2002-2012 period, individuals working under fixed-term contracts received, on average, hourly
wages that were 20.57 log points below those working under permanent contracts. By looking at the empirical wage
distributions of raw wage of both fixed-term and permanent workers, which are depicted in Figure 2 (a), we can plainly
conclude that wages of fixed-term workers are lower and less dispersed than those of permanent workers.
However, controlling for the observable characteristics (age, tenure, education, gender and time specific effects),
the wage penalty is reduced to 1.72 log points. This reduction reflects the fact that workers under fixed-term contracts
are, on average, less experienced and have shorter tenure within the firms. When the worker, firm and job-title fixed
effects are incorporated in the model, the remaining unexplained wage gap between fixed-term and permanent contracts
falls to -1.44 log points. Consequently, the small reduction of about 0.28 log points in the conditional FTC wage gap
is due to the inclusion of the three fixed effects.
These results are not surprising since they are consistent with the existing literature. As previously mentioned,
all studies found that fixed-term workers earn, on average, less than permanent workers. They also conclude that the
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conditional wage gap is always smaller than the raw one. However, the estimates from the three high dimensional
specification cannot be compared with previous results since it was never applied for the FTC wage gap. Moreover, we
need to be careful when comparing the magnitude of previous estimates for the FTC wage gap since there is no similar
study for Portugal.
Figure 2: The empirical distributions of wages and worker, firm and job-titles fixed effects
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Kernel density of job−title fixed effects, by type of contract
We can get a better understanding of the shape of the conditional wage distribution by analyzing the distributions
of worker, firm and job-title fixed effects. Figure 2 (b) shows the distribution of individual fixed effects for both
permanent and fixed-term workers. As stated above, the individual fixed effects are time-invariant, worker-specific
component of workers, which can be either observable (such as gender) or unobservable. A worker with a high
fixed effect is an individual who receives a hourly wage higher than expected, based on observable time-varying
characteristics (such as age) and given the time-invariant characteristics of the corresponding firm and the job-title.
Individual worker heterogeneity plays an important role in the wage setting process. The linear correlation between the
natural logarithm of real hourly wages and worker fixed effects is 0.80. The shape of worker fixed effects distributions
also shows that worker fixed effects of fixed-term workers are, on average, lower and more concentrated compared with
those of permanent workers. To sum up, individuals working under fixed-term contracts have, on average, permanent
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characteristics which are related to lower wages.
The empirical distribution of firm fixed-effects is presented in Figure 2 (b). By the same reasoning, a firm with
a high fixed effect value is a firm with a generous compensation policy (higher than the expected one), given the
time-varying characteristics, the heterogeneity of workers and job titles. Again, firm heterogeneity is an important
determinant of the wages. In fact, the linear correlation between the natural logarithm of real hourly wages and worker
fixed effects is 0.64. According to Figure 2 (c), the empirical distribution of firm fixed effects of fixed-term workers
is similar to that of permanent workers, but more concentrated. It is difficult to reach a clear conclusion just by
analyzing those empirical distributions since at both (lower and upper) tails permanent workers are more concentrated
than fixed-term workers. Therefore, a more careful analysis must be performed.
Finally, Figure 2 (d) depicts the empirical distribution of job-title fixed effects, making the difference between
fixed-term and permanent workers. We should note that job-title is defined as the combination between the worker’s
hierarchical position within the firm and the collective agreement covering the respective firm. As mentioned by Torres
et al. (2013), a disaggregated occupational count list would not be sufficient for the identification of job-title, since the
same occupation (e.g. top executive) may be governed by different collective agreements, depending on the firm (e.g.
the retail trade agreement may define different conditions than the banking industry agreement). So, the job-title notion
is just a refinement of the usual notion of occupation. Similarly, a high job effect title means a higher hourly wage
than expected given the observable time-varying characteristics, the permanent heterogeneity of workers and firms. By
looking at the empirical distribution of job-title fixed effects, it is clear that fixed-term workers filled occupations in
which they were, on average, paid below those on permanent contracts.
5.2.3 The Decomposition of FTC Wage Gap
At first sight, it may appear that including the three fixed effects in the base model is not so relevant as we would
expect since the wage gap only changes by 0.28 log points. However, this is not the full picture of the story. In
order to estimate the independent contribution of each fixed effect on the estimated wage gap, we use the Gelbach’s
decomposition.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 1. The decomposition indicates that the worker, firm and
job-title fixed effects account, respectively, for -3.92, 4.23 and -0.59 log points of that reduction. This means that
the remaining 1.44 log points of the FTC wage penalty are still unexplained even controlling for the observable
time-varying characteristics of firms and workers, the date of observation and the permanent characteristics of workers,
firms and job-titles.
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Table 1: The FTC Wage Gap and the Gelbach’s Decomposition of the Wage Gap
Coefficient of Decomposition
Base model - FTC Wage Gap -1.72
Full model - FTC Wage Gap -1.44
Base-Full difference -0.28
Contribution of Worker Fixed Effect -3.92
Contribution of Firm Fixed Effect 4.23
Contribution of Job Title Fixed Effect -0.59
Note: All coefficients are indicated in log-points scale and are statistically significant at 1%.
As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of worker fixed effect allows us to control for all the observed and unobserved
time-invariant characteristics of an individual which influences his/her total compensation. However, the main reason
behind the use of worker fixed effect is to control for unobserved permanent characteristics of the individuals. One
simple and economically meaningful interpretation for the unobserved permanent characteristics is that they capture the
ability of the worker. Although being unobserved by the researcher, the ability of an individual is directly related with
his/her productivity which is in turn detected by the employee. Therefore, the total worker’s compensation reflects the
feedback of the employer regarding his/her productivity. How can differences in the ability among individuals explain
the conditional wage gap? The decomposition suggests that, on average, individuals working under FTC possess
permanent characteristics that are associated with a wage penalty when compared to permanent workers. Relating this
empirical evidence to the worker’s ability explanation, we may conclude that, on average, the abilities of workers on
FTC are lower than those working on permanent contracts. Again, this is not an unexpected result. Previous studies
found that the estimated FTC wage gap is reduced by including individual-fixed effects in the standard OLS wage
equation (e.g. Mertens et al, 2007; Booth et al., 2002).
The above result is also consistent with the screening hypothesis for the use of FTC. As Portugal has a strict EPL,
firms might keep new hires, workers with uncertain abilities, or even lower quality workers in fixed term contracts as an
extended probation period. Consequently, fixed-term contracts will have an overrepresentation of low ability workers.
The allocation of workers on fixed-term and permanent contracts into different firms plays an important role in the
wage variation. Why should workers of apparently equal ability be paid differently on similar jobs, but in different
firms? Prior evidence suggested that some firms have non-trivial power in the labor market. As there are different types
of market power across firms, they tend to be different in terms of compensation policies (e.g. Webber, 2013). The
persistent wage differentials across firms can be explained by some market frictions, such as imperfect information
or mobility costs. Even in Portugal, where there is a considerable centralized system of wage bargaining, specific
characteristics of firms often lead them to deviate from the agreed mandatory wage floors for each professional category
of workers (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005).
The observed and unobserved permanent characteristics of firms which influence the compensation payments are
accounted for by including firm fixed-effects (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 2001). As suggested by Vilares
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(2013), the firm fixed-effect can be interpreted as the observed and unobserved human resources and wage policies
across firms which influence the worker compensation. Unexpectedly, by using the Gelbach’s decomposition, we find
that workers on fixed-term contract tend to sort themselves into firms with more generous remuneration policies. A
small segment of the literature found that the inclusion of firms fixed-effects (but not worker fixed-effects) in the wage
equation contributes to reduce the estimated FTC wage gap relatively to the usual conditional wage gap (e.g., Pteifer,
2012). This suggests that fixed-term workers tend to be sorted into low-paying firms. However, our evidence supports
a totally different hypothesis, at least for Portugal.
As a direct consequence of this result, we find evidence against the dual labor market theory which argues that
workers on fixed-term contracts are sorted into low-paying firms. What can support this result? Why are fixed-term
workers, on average, rewarded by their allocation across firms? From an employer view, it may suggest that high paying
firms prefer to establish fixed-term contracts more frequently than low paying ones. In an economic downturn, if it is
difficult to fire workers, firms that practice more generous wage policies face higher costs than other firms. Therefore,
when there is a strict EPL governing permanent contracts, such as the Portuguese case, we should expect that high
paying firms to use more fixed-term workers than low paying firms. In other words, high paying firms are more likely
to use FTC as buffer stock than the low-paying firms. Consistently, fixed-term workers would be, on average, more
allocated into high paying firms.
Finally, the differences across occupations and the variations across collective agreements with influence on the
total compensation are taken into account with the inclusion of job-title fixed effect. The results of the Gelbach’s
decomposition suggest that workers on FTC suffer a small wage penalty due to the mechanism of sorting among
job-titles.
A question which may arise is: why are FTC workers segregated into low-paying job-titles? Contrary to the firm
fixed effects, the result is not surprising. In reality, a number of reasons may be behind this outcome. Particularly,
two main mechanisms should be underlined. First, it is highly plausible that job promotions are biased in favor of
permanent workers. One possibility is that, all other things being equal, employers may prefer to promote workers
under permanent contracts rather than fixed-term workers. Obviously, fixed-term jobs have, on average, a lower job
duration (e.g. Booth et al., 2002). Therefore, employers may prefer to promote permanent workers since they tend to
result into more stable relationships, which may be a positive feature for high hierarchical positions. Additionally, there
is evidence that fixed-term contracts are used to facilitate short-term labor adjustment. Employers may prefer to have
these flexible stock at lower hierarchical positions. Besides this, as the fixed-term contracts have a maximum duration
period, those workers have a limited period to achieve promotions. Probably, before promoting those workers, the firms
will convert them into permanent workers and therefore the high hierarchical positions will be held by regular workers.
This is also consistent with the screening hypothesis. In reality, the lack of opportunities for career development
associated with temporary contracts is well documented in several studies (e.g. Farber, 1999; Booth et al., 2002). A
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second credible theoretical explanation for these results is the role of unions. Sometimes workers are allocated into
jobs that, by their nature, give them a higher bargaining power (e.g., if they can impose significant loses upon their
employers). If unions are able to organize such workers, they will be in a strong bargaining position, resulting in higher
wages. Our empirical result may suggest that FTC are not allocated into jobs with these characteristics. Furthermore,
the insider-outsider theory states that permanent workers are usually able to create entry barriers to certain occupations
for outsiders (that is, temporary workers). The possible set of reasons do not stop here. For example, if FTC are more
concentrated into jobs with safe tasks, that are performed under pleasant conditions or that are overcrowded, we should
expect a negative wage penalty associated with those jobs (Torres et al., 2013). However, there is a lack of theoretical
arguments for supporting those alternative explanations.
In a nutshell, although the reduction on the FTC wage gap due to the inclusion of the three fixed-effects may
appear too small, the Gelbach’s decomposition allows us to go deeper, achieving a quite interesting conclusion. The
results suggest that both worker and firm fixed-effects are two important factors driving the wage penalty for fixed-term
workers. Their contributions to the reduction on the FTC wage gap have almost the same magnitude but they go on
opposite directions. On one hand, fixed-term workers have characteristics which are associated with a wage penalty
when comparing to permanent workers. On the other hand, workers under fixed-term contracts are, on average, more
allocated into firms with generous compensation policies. The role of job-title appears to be less important than those
two factors.
5.3 The Role of Worker-firm Match Quality
5.3.1 Statistical Framework: including the Role of Worker-firm Match Quality
In this sub-section, we analyze the relevance of the worker-firm match quality to explain the wage gap between
fixed-term and permanent contracts. Woodcock (2007) shows that the estimates obtained with equation (1) may be
subject to a substantial bias if the worker-firm match characteristics constitute an important determinant of wage
variability. Thus, in this section, we consider an alternative empirical framework by including a worker-firm match
specific fixed-effect (ψi f ) that accounts for worker-firm match heterogeneity. The economic interpretation of the
variable is quite simple: it measures the returns to unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the matches between a
worker and a firm. Thus, by accounting for the match effect, the model becomes:
wi f jt = αi +θ f +ψi f +λ j + γt +ξ FTCit +Xi f tβ + εi f jt (5a)
However, this specification is overparameterized, meaning that we are unable to disentangle the three effects
(worker, firm and worker-firm match fixed effects). As discussed by Figueiredo et al (2014), “in this model a good
match may be indistinguishable from a good worker working in a good firm”. In other words, worker-firm specific
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fixed effect (ψi f ) captures the effect of both individual (αi) and firm (θ f ) fixed effects. Therefore, a specification with a
single worker-firm interaction term (ωi f ) absorbs the three mentioned fixed-effects and leads to the identical estimates
for the parameters λ j, γt , ξ and β as equation (5a). The matching model can be represented as follows:
wi f jt = ωi f +λ j + γt +ξ FTCit +Xi f tβ + εi f jt (5b)
It is worth noting that, the fact that we cannot estimate ψi f does not constitute a reason for concern if we are not
interested in the match effect, per se, but in its relation with the parameter of interest (ξ ), after controlling for the other
explanatory variables. This detail is notably discussed by Figueiredo et al. (2014) who show that the coefficients in a
regression of the estimated ψi f in all the other explanatory variables included in the specification (5a) can be simply
obtained from the subtraction between the estimated coefficients in (5b) and those estimated in (1). More precisely, the
effect of ψi f on the FTC wage gap can be directly obtained from the comparison between the coefficient ξ estimated
in equation (5b) from that in (1).
As in the previous specification, we are able to apply the Gelbach’s estimation to compute the exact contribution of
each fixed effect to the conditional wage gap. However, we must be aware that we can only disentangle the contribution
to the FTC wage gap of the job-title fixed effect from the jointly contribution of the worker, firm and worker-firm match
permanent characteristics. In other words, as the worker-firm interaction term (ωi f ) absorbs those three effects, we lose
track to their independent contributions.
5.3.2 Empirical Results
The estimation of the matching model reduces the FTC wage penalty to -0.79 log points. As in the previous sub-section,
an interesting exercise is to perform Gelbach’s decomposition. Note that the base model remains exactly the same as
before, that is, it is represented by the standard Mincerian equation controlling for gender, age, tenure and education
levels.
The results of the composition proposed by Gelbach are now described in the Table 2. The four fixed effects
(worker, firm, job-title and worker-firm match fixed effects) are responsible for a non-negligible part of the conditional
FTC wage gap. In reality, they account for -0.93 log points of the difference between the wage of FTC and PC, where
a penalty of -0.52 log points is due to the jointly effect of the worker, firm and worker-firm match qualities while the
other -0.41 log points are accounted for by the job-title fixed effect.
Comparing with the results presented in Table 1, we can see that the contribution of the job-title heterogeneity to
the wage gap remains roughly the same. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish the contribution of worker, firm
and worker-firm match fixed effect. Additionally, their joint contribution is small (such as the one of job-title fixed
effect). However, this is not surprising. By analyzing the results of Table 1, we concluded that the contribution of
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Table 2: The FTC Wage Gap and the Gelbach’s Decomposition of the Wage Gap - Matching model
Coefficient of Decomposition
Base model - FTC Wage Gap -1.72
Matching model - FTC Wage Gap -0.79
Base-Full difference -0.93
Joint Contribution of Worker, Firm and Worker-Firm Match Fixed Effects -0.52
Contribution of Job Title Fixed Effect -0.41
Note: All coefficients are indicated in log-points scale and are statistically significant at 1%.
firm and worker fixed effects have almost the same magnitude, but different signals. Therefore, as the iteration term
captures both effects, they are possibly canceling out each other. Nevertheless, the joint contribution also depends on
the worker-firm match heterogeneity.
In order to assess the role of match quality, we follow the procedure proposed by Figueiredo et. al (2014). By
subtracting the estimated coefficient of interest in equation (5b) from that in equation (1), we can conclude that the
worker-firm match fixed effect is responsible for 0.65 log points of the wage penalty.
We found that permanent workers receive a wage premium due to the fact they are usually allocated into jobs where
the worker-firm match quality is higher. Why are fixed-term contracts segmented into low quality worker-firm pairs?
Once again, the result is not surprising, but it has a meaningful economic interpretation. The quality of worker-firm
match is not observable until the creation and “experimentation” over time of that match. In other words, a fixed-term
contract may be used to screen either the quality of the match or the quality of the worker. Employers may use
fixed-term contract to screen at a lower cost the quality of the match (and of the worker): if they satisfy some standard
requirements, they will be converted into permanent contracts (Silva, 2014). Thus, we should expect that permanent
worker-firm pairs result, on average, in a higher quality match.
6 Conclusion
The Portuguese labor market is characterized by a large employment protection gap between permanent and fixed-term
workers. As a consequence, fixed-term contracts have become an important segment of dependent employment,
representing about 19.8% of total employment in 2012.
Since there is no theoretical consensus about the wage effects of using fixed-term contracts, it becomes essentially
an empirical question. In this paper, besides estimating the wage gap between fixed-term and permanent workers, we
looked at the sources of that wage gap. Firstly, estimating a wage regression with three high dimensional fixed effects,
we obtained the worker, firm and job-title fixed effects. Then, resorting to the Gelbach’s decomposition, we compute
the unambiguous and independent contribution of each fixed effect for the wage gap between fixed-term contracts. Our
results show evidence that there is a small wage penalty of about 1.72 log points for fixed-term workers.
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We found that worker heterogeneity is an important source of the wage penalty, accounting for -3.92 log points of
the wage gap. In fact, the decomposition showed that, on average, fixed-term workers possess characteristics that are
related with lower wages when compared with permanent workers. This result is broadly in line with the screening
hypothesis for the use of fixed-term contracts. If fixed-term contracts are used to screen unobserved abilities of workers,
fixed-term contracts will have a higher proportion of low ability individuals when compared to permanent workers.
The decomposition also indicates that allocation of fixed-term workers into lower paid job titles is responsible for
a modest of the FTC wage penalty (-0.59 log points). Since the job-title is defined as the combination between the
worker’s occupation and the collective agreement covering the firm, this evidence may be due to two possible reasons:
relatively higher hierarchical positions tend to be occupied more frequently by permanent workers; or workers with
fixed-term contracts are more concentrated in sectors in which unions have a lower bargaining power.
Contrarily, sorting into firms attenuates the existence of the FTC wage penalty, with the conditional contribution
of 4.23 log points in favor of fixed term workers. Compensation policies differ across firms due to the application of
efficiency wages or the exercise of monopoly power. We found that individuals working under a fixed-term contract
tend to be allocated into firms with more generous wage policies. This contradicts the dual labor market theory, which
argues that fixed-term workers are allocated into low-paying firms. Alternatively, it suggest that firms with more
suitable wage offers may use fixed-term workers more as a buffer stock than permanent counterparts.
Furthermore, relying on the methodology proposed by Figueiredo et al. (2014), we obtained that worker-firm match
characteristics are also responsible for just -0.65 log points of the FTC wage gap. Again, since fixed-term contracts are
used as a screening device to search for good matches (besides high ability workers), they have an overrepresentation
of low quality worker-firm matches.
Regarding the self-selection problem, further research is needed. Introducing the four fixed-effects is an unprecedented
methodology that helps mitigating the problem but it may not be enough if unobserved, time-variant characteristics of
worker, firm, job-title and worker-firm match are correlated with the error term.
Finally, some academic experts have been arguing in favor of introducing of a single labor contract by highlighting
the negative effects of the coexistence of permanent and temporary contracts. Among those policy initiatives are, for
example, those of Blanchard and Tirole (2003) for France and a manifesto subscribed by 100 economists for Spain
(Andrés et al., 2008). Despite not refusing the negative effects of fixed-term contracts on other dimensions (such as
higher job turnover or lower productivity), our results suggest that the single labor contract should not be advocated on
the basis of wage discrimination since we only find a small wage penalty for fixed-term workers.
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7 Appendix
Appendix A - Descriptive statistics for the 2002-2012 period
Table 3: Summary statistics for the 2002-2012 period
Fixed-term workers Permanent Workers
Hourly wage (1986 euros) 1.57 2.12
Minimum hourly wage (1986 euros) 0.55 0.56
Maximum hourly wage (1986 euros) 1803.11 1886.65
Age (in years) 33.00 38.61
Tenure (number of months in current firm) 24.45 116.50
Female (%) 45.08 43.46
Education (%)
Less than basic school 1.39 1.10
1st stage of basic school 15.80 21.50
2nd stage of basic school 18.82 20.23
3rd stage of basic school 27.22 21.67
Secondary education 23.50 21.55
Post-secondary but not higher education 0.32 0.21
Higher education - Bachelor 1.93 2.46
Higher education - Undergraduate 10.41 10.75
Higher education - Masters 0.52 0.46




Wholesale and retail trade 19.82 21.72
Hotels and restaurants 10.77 6.35
Transports 5.63 6.74
Finance and business services 13.15 14.10
Education, health and public administration 11.73 9.26
Other activities of collective, social and personal services 4.67 3.62
No. observations 4,569,043 16,065,441
Note: This reports summary statistics (mean) for the 2002-2012 period. The units are explained in front of the variables.
Compensation variables expressed in euros are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (with the reference year of 1986).
Education, female and industry are shown as percentage.
Appendix B - Gelbach’s Conditional Decomposition (2014)
As a first step, the reference model for the decomposition has to be estimated. Note that, during our study, we resort to
this methodology twice. Therefore, we need to define two full specifications: the three high dimensional fixed effects
model and the matching model. However, for simplicity, we will describe this decomposition considering our first full
model: worker, firm and job-title FE model.
Then, the extended Mincerian wage equation, accounting for the worker, firm and job-title fixed effects, has to be
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estimated:
wi f jt = αi +θ f +λ j +Xitβ f ull + ε
f ull
i f jt (6)
This specification is the same considered in equation (1), but the variable of interest (FTC dummy) is now included
in the matrix Xi f t . Secondly, we considered as a base model the one that exludes the three fixed effects and therefore
the model becomes:
wi f jt = Xitβ base + εbasei f jt (7)







itwi f jt (8)





it and replacing wi f jtby the full specification, we have:
β̂
base = PX (αi +θ f +λ j +Xitβ f ull + ε
f ull
i f jt ) (9)
β̂
base− β̂ f ull = PX α̂i +PX θ̂ f +PX λ̂ j (10)
Note that the terms on the right side of equation (10) are the coefficients of the estimates of fixed-effects on the
regressors included in the base model.Then, we have to run the regressions of the estimated fixed effects on each
explanatory variable:
α̂i = Xitδα +να (11a)
θ̂ f = Xitδθ +νθ (11b)
λ̂ j = Xitδλ +νλ (11c)
Where να , νθ and νλ are the corresponding error terms. Thus, centering our interest on the coefficient for the FTC
dummy variable, we have the identity:
ξ̂
base− ξ̂ f ull = δ̂FTCα + δ̂FFTCθ + δ̂FTCλ (12)
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In the above equation ξ̂ f ull andξ̂ base represent the estimates for the coefficients associated with the FTC dummy
in equations (6) and (7), respectively. Additionally, δ̂FTCα , δ̂FFTCθ and δ̂FTCλ are the coefficients estimates associated
with the FTC dummy variable on equations (11a)-(11c). This is our final result allowing to decompose the change in
the coefficient estimates associated with FTC variable by worker, firm and job-title fixed effect.
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